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Abstract
An advocate for a special interest provides information to an uninformed planner
for her to consider in making a sequence of important decisions. Although the
advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is is also known that the
advocate is biased and will distort her advice if necessary to in￿ uence the planner￿ s
decision. Each time she repeats the problem, however, the planner learns about
the accuracy of the advocate￿ s recommendation, mitigating some of the advocate￿ s
incentive to act in a self-serving manner. We propose a theory of advocacy to explain
why planners do sometimes rely on information provided by advocates in making
decisions. The interaction takes place in two stages, a cheap talk recommendation
from the advocate, followed by decisions and learning by the planner. The theory
predicts conditions under which an advocate￿ s advice will be ignored and when it will
in￿ uence a planner￿ s decision, when planners will prefer the advice of an advocate
to the advice of a neutral adviser and, ￿nally, how an advocate gains in￿ uence with
a decision maker by making his preferences for action unpredictable. Applications
of our theory are used to explain why regulated enterprises are sometimes delegated
authority to determine how they are monitored and why some consumers of ￿nancial
services give ￿nancial advisors who bene￿t from their business such great latitude in
managing their investments and ￿nances.1 Introduction
What do the following situations share in common? A ￿nancial advisor suggests to a
client that she invest more money in the advisor￿ s mutual fund. A drug company assures
the FDA that its antidepressant medication is safe and e⁄ective for the treatment of a
variety of ailments, beyond those for which it is currently approved. A representative of a
polluting ￿rm gives testimony to congress about the economic and environmental impact
of stricter emissions standards. An advocate for children petitions the mayor for greater
funding of head start and school nutrition programs, claiming that these programs improve
academic performance and behavior.
In each of these examples a decision maker or planner solicits a recommendation from
an informed advisor. In these settings the advisor may be an advocate for his own self
interest, as in the case of the ￿nancial advisor1 or drug company, or, like the child advo-
cate, he may be a supporter of a particular cause. In each instance the advisor is known
to have strong preferences for actions that may con￿ ict with the planner￿ s best interest:
the ￿nancial advisor bene￿ts when the consumer invests more money, whether or not this
is in the interest of the consumer; the child advocate seeks to maximize the budget for
the head start program, to the possible detriment of other deserving social programs, a
polluting ￿rm bene￿ts ￿nancially when emissions standards are relaxed, regardless of the
larger environmental impact. Furthermore, in each of these scenarios it is not possible
for the planner to directly observe whether the advocate￿ s advice is based on his superior
information, or if it is simply self serving. However, in each of these settings, the plan-
ner could face a sequence of decisions, and therefore may have an opportunity to learn
something about the accuracy of the advocate￿ s advice from her own experience.
Each of these settings is an example of a planner "relying on information from inter-
ested parties." This peculiar practice has been much studied by economists and political
scientists, but is still not completely understood. Many analyses of these situations have
assumed that, while the advocate may withhold damaging information, he can not make
false representations of what he knows.2 The inability to make false claims renders harm-
1For the most part, we ignore the possibility that ￿nancial advisors have ￿duciary responsibilities,
and treat ￿nancial advisors as self-interested agents. Section 5, deals with what may happen if a certain
portion of advisors take their ￿duciary obligations seriously.
2For example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Milgrom (1981), Cotton (2009, 2010), Milgrom and
Roberts (1986), Bull and Watson (2007, 2004).
1less the misalignment of preferences between the advocate and planner and may even make
the advocate a preferred type of advisor. Despite his incentive to o⁄er biased information,
the advocate can always make a complete and truthful disclosure. If the advocate does
not provide evidence for her most favored state of the world, the planner can safely con-
clude it doesn￿ t exist, otherwise he would have exposed it. Because of this unravelling,
the advocate has no recourse but to disclose the state that actually occurs. Furthermore,
because advocates bene￿t if they can prove that their preferred state exists, they have
greater incentives to acquire information than impartial advisors.3
This rationale for relying on the information of interested parties appears much less
compelling, however, in settings where planners are unable to independently verify the
information or advice provided by advocates. If information is soft, the planner must
evaluate the advocate￿ s motives; here opportunities for mutually bene￿cial exchange of in-
formation are diminished. Other analyses of in￿ uential communication of soft information
have identi￿ed situations in which in￿ uential communication can take place in equilibrium.
In the delegation and single dimensional cheap talk literature,4 the advisor￿ s ideal action
is higher than the decision maker￿ s by a ￿nite bias; the advisor therefore has an incentive
to exaggerate the state, but only to a point. The bounded incentive to exaggerate means
that the planner and advocate have some common interest, which allows some, but not
all information to be conveyed. In￿ uential communication also can take place in repeated
settings in which.the decision maker has some uncertainty about the "agenda" of the ad-
visor (whether he is representing her interests or his own). In this environment both types
of advisors have a reputational incentive to appear unbiased. In￿ uential communication
can happen in equilibrium both because the advisor may truly represent the interests of
the decision maker, and because a self-interested advisor would like to appear unbiased (at
least initially).5 In our analysis, we rule out these channels for in￿ uential communication
by focusing on settings in which it is common knowledge that the advocate always bene￿ts
3See Aghion and Tirole (1997) who argue that advocates who are delegated decision making authority
are more easily induced to gather information. A complementary explanation for the use of (competing)
advocates in judicial proceedings is provided by Dewatripont and Tirole(1994) who demonstrate the
bene￿ts that biased advocates derive from gathering information. Che and Kartik (2009) show decision
makers may prefer to consult with advisers who are unbiased but have di⁄erent opinions about the likely
state of the world.
4Crawford and Sobel (1982), Dessein (2002), Ambrus and Egorov (2009)
5Morris (2002) and Sobel (1985), similar ideas appear in the carrer concerns literature, for example
Prendergast (1993), Ottaviani and Sorenson (2006), Prat (2005). Although communication is in￿ uential,
these settings have their own set of di¢ culties. See the previous references for more information.
2from increased actions.6
Despite their di⁄erences, each party has something valuable to o⁄er the other: the
advocate can o⁄er the planner valuable advice, and the planner has the authority to select
actions that are important to the advocate. Is it possible for the parties to somehow arrange
a mutually bene￿cial exchange of advice for in￿ uence even with common knowledge of the
extreme misalignment of preferences? If so, how? Our goal in this paper is develop a
theory of advocacy to address these questions.
Our investigation centers on a cheap talk model that captures features of di⁄erent
advocacy relationships that we observe in practice and discuss above. In a repeated
setting, a planner adjusts her action in each period to match an unknown state of the
environment. The state may represent the returns on investment or the comparative
bene￿ts of child assistance in a particular period; the planner￿ s action may be the amount
of money she allocates to her ￿nancial advisor, or the resources she devotes to social
services for children. The state in each period is stochastic, and is publicly revealed after
the planner has selected an action.7 The planner is uncertain about the distribution
of the state. The ￿nancial advisor￿ s investment strategies may generate returns with a
higher mean than the market, or they may be worse on average than the market as a
whole. While the impact of child assistance programs certainly varies over time, e⁄ective
programs are more likely to produce substantial improvements than ine⁄ective programs.
An advisor knows the distribution from which the states are drawn, either ￿H or ￿L, but
like the planner is unable to observe the state until after the planner selects an action. The
advisor is known to be an advocate; he always prefers that the planner increase her action,
independent of the true state. The advocate is biased either because he personally bene￿ts
from higher actions, as in the case of the ￿nancial planner, drug company, or polluting
￿rm, or because he cares about a particular cause, like the advocate for children.
The theory we propose addresses the fundamental problem that advocates pose for
6The multidimensional cheap talk literature (See for example, Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2009).)
has also identi￿ed conditions under which the capability to trade o⁄ di⁄erent aspects of a decision allows
in￿ uential communication to take place in equilibrium. Although our setting appears to be similar, with
future decisions playing the role of multiple "aspects" of a single problem, we rule out these types of e⁄ects
by assuming that the planner and advocate have the same discount factor, so that each "aspect" of the
decision is given the same weight. Consult the extended appendix for more information.
7For simplicity we also assume that the planner￿ s ability to observe the true state after she selects her
action does not depend on the action that she chooses. This simplifying assumption may not be realistic
in certain situations. Relaxing this assumption introduces an additional tradeo⁄ into the problem, which
we leave for future work.
3planners. The planner clearly bene￿ts from knowing the state distribution at the begin-
ning of the interaction, but without access to payments (contingent on the advocate￿ s
recommendation), it is very di¢ cult to align the advocate￿ s incentives with the planner￿ s.8
With common knowledge of the advocate￿ s unyielding preference for high action and his
associated incentive to manipulate the planner, it may seem that there is little or no scope
for meaningful communication between the parties. Because the planner can learn about
the state distribution through her own experience (that is, from the history of observed
states) she may prefer to ignore the advocate￿ s advice and act on her own. Does the plan-
ner￿ s ability to learn also allow the parties to arrange bene￿cial exchanges of advice for
in￿ uence? Our analysis of this setting leads to a theory of advocacy that has the following
predictions
1) An advocate can only in￿uence the planner in a formal long term arrangement
Given the planner￿ s choice between learning on her own or learning from the advocate, our
theory characterizes settings in which the advocate￿ s advice is ignored entirely. This oc-
curs whenever (i) the planner makes a one-time decision, or (ii) planner makes a sequence
of decisions but she can not commit to act based on the advocate￿ s advice. In the ￿rst
case if the planner changes her action in response to the advocate￿ s advice, he will always
manipulate her into choosing the higher action. Absent the ability to ￿ne the advocate
for bad advice, or a future in which to punish him, the planner has no recourse other than
to ignore his advice. In the second case, the problem is very similar. If the advocate￿ s
recommendation suggests to the planner that the low distribution is more likely, the plan-
ner will choose a lower action in each period, hurting the advocate￿ s payo⁄. Without the
ability to commit, the planner can not assure the advocate that he won￿ t be penalized
for revealing the low distribution Without this assurance, we show that no informative
communication equilibrium exists.9 These no-trade results are rather disappointing, but
8There are two rationale for assuming that report-contingent payments are not possible. The ￿rst is
that payments for information are di¢ cult if not impossible to implement without the ability to objectively
verify the accuracy of the information that is reported. The second is that monetary transfers between
public o¢ cials and private interests may facilitate corrupt or illegal exchanges of favors or services, and is
therefore prohibited.
If monetary or non monetary utility transfers can be conditioned on the advocates report, then it is
possible to induce the advocate to reveal information. See Ambrus and Egorov (2009 a,b) in the context
of a theory of bureaucracy and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) in the context of commercial transactions.
9In contrast Morris (2001) and Sobel (1985) ￿nd informative communication may exist in repeated
settings without commitment. However they assume (1) that the advisor￿ s preferences may be identical
to those of the decision maker and (2) that the state changes and the advisor learns the new state in each
4predictable, given the disparate preferences the parties and the limited agreements that
are available for governing the planner￿ s behavior in response to the advocate￿ s advice.
2) Advocates who appear to be credible are in￿uential
Our theory predicts conditions under which bene￿cial exchanges of information for in￿ u-
ence can be arranged; we also characterize the optimal implementation of these agreements.
In a repeated setting we show it is possible for the parties to arrange for the advocate to
advise the planner in exchange for the planner￿ s commitment to select certain actions.
Under the optimal arrangement, when the advocate reports ￿L; the unfavorable distrib-
ution, the planner commits to a ￿xed long term action that exceeds the action she ￿nds
optimal under the low distribution. We interpret this as a compromise the planner makes
in return for the advocate￿ s disclosure of unfavorable news. When the advocate reports
that the distribution is ￿H; the planner commits to a sequence of actions that is contin-
gent on the history of observed states. The actions converge towards the planner￿ s optimal
high action when the history of state observations supports the advocate￿ s claim that the
distribution is ￿H. However, if the history of observed states contradicts the advocate￿ s
claim, the planner￿ s actions are progressively reduced. We interpret this as the planner￿ s
commitment to trust the advocate￿ s advice, as long as his advice appears valid given her
experience.
Our theory of how advocates exert in￿ uence also suggests an explanation for many of
the formal and implicit advisory agreements we observe in practice. For instance drug
regulators who adjust the scope in which certain medicines are used depending on the
outcomes employ a form of the credible oversight agreement predicted by the theory. Sim-
ilarly, an agreement to follow the advice of a ￿nancial planner as long as his performance
is consistent with his claims is consistent with our theory.
3) Biased advocates may be preferred to impartial advisors
Our theory provides some clues as to the origins of advocacy by describing situations in
which advocates are preferred to impartial advisors. Most analyses of advocacy presume
that planners rely on advocates for advice because advocates must be informed about issues
that they care so much about. While this is often true it doesn￿ t explain why planners
don￿ t prefer to consult other informed but potentially less biased sources for advice.
period. By issuing truthful recommendations, biased advisors may establish a reputation for credibility,
which they may pro￿tably exploit in later periods.
5One rationale for preferring advocates to impartial advisers, implied by our theory,
is that it is easier to motivate advocates to acquire information than impartial advisors.
Suppose the planner may consult a biased advocate or an objective adviser for information
on what action to take. The advocate and impartial advisor must both expend resources
of c > 0 to become informed. Once informed, the impartial advisor truthfully reports his
information, whereas the advocate requires the planner to adopt certain costly actions in
return for revealing his information truthfully. We show, surprisingly, that it can be less
costly for the planner to obtain information from the advocate than from the impartial
adviser. Because the advocate cares about the planner￿ s actions while the impartial advisor
doesn￿ t, the advocate can be motivated to learn through the planner￿ s actions, while the
impartial advisor will only learn if his cost is fully reimbursed. When the advocate has
a strong incentive to correctly communicate the state distribution he subsidizes learning;
the distorted actions necessary to induce learning generate a smaller payo⁄ cost to the
planner than the cost of learning, c. Ironically our theory shows that it is the advocate￿ s
extreme preference for high actions that sometimes makes him a more attractive source of
information than an objective advisor.
4) When the advisor might be impartial, advocates exert greater in￿uence
Our theory predicts that an advocate with a known preferences for high actions has
no impact on the planner￿ s expected action choice; the planner chooses the same average
action whether or not she is advised by the advocate. Although the advocate￿ s advice
in￿ uences the planner to make better decisions to the planner￿ s bene￿t, the advocate is
unable to induce the planner to select higher actions on average. In contrast, when the
planner is uncertain whether the advisor is an advocate or impartial, our theory shows
that the advocate commands a rent to reveal his con￿ ict of interest, leading to a higher
average action.
To illustrate, suppose the planner has D ￿ 2 distinct types of decisions to make. She
consults with an advocate who has extreme preferences for one unknown type of decision,
but is impartial with respect to the other D ￿ 1 decisions. For any given decision, the
planner will not know if the advisor has an incentive to o⁄er impartial or biased advice.
An advocate thus has an incentive to appear impartial in order to give a manipulative
report undeserved credibility. To make this possibility unattractive, the planner commits
to a concession, choosing actions that are, on average more aligned with the advocate￿ s
6preferences when he reveals his con￿ ict of interest.
This ￿nding has a paradoxical quality to it. The most e⁄ective advocate is a stealth
advocate, one who is not known for supporting a particular cause or special interest group
Advocates are severely constrained by the causes that they are identi￿ed with; it is ironic,
that once an advocate becomes a known supporter of a particular issue, he relinquishes
his ability to impact the planners choice of action on that issue. By hiding his causes from
the planner, the advocate is able to advance his agenda more e⁄ectively.
This paper is an application of the literature on strategic information transmission that
began with Crawford and Sobel (1982), Grossman (81) and Milgrom (81) who provide the
￿rst analyses of decision makers relying on the information of interested parties. Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1999) and Morris (2001) were the ￿rst to model the role of biased
advocates in advising planners about what actions to take. Our results shed light on the
planner￿ s choice of adviser and predict when an advocate is preferred to an objective ad-
viser. Like Dewatripont and Tirole we ￿nd that advocates are sometime preferred because
they can be induced to acquire information at a lower cost.10
The overarching theme of our theory is that advocates are severely handicapped by
their inability to certify their advice. This exposes an important quali￿cation for the
use of advocates in the fact ￿nding settings analyzed by Dewatripont and Tirole(1999),
Shin(1998) and Krishna and Morgan(1998) who require advocates to present hard evidence
of their claims. In contrast, in the cheap talk setting of this paper, advocates with known
biases can have only a limited impact on the planners￿behavior. Nonetheless planners
continue to rely on advocates for advice, in situations where the validity of the advocate￿ s
advice can be assessed. This is consistent with the results of Sobel (1985) and Morris (2002)
although the channels for implementing meaningful communication are quite di⁄erent
across the three models. It also shares elements of Strausz￿ s (2005) theory of interim
information in employment contracts, and Cooper and Hayes (1987) analysis of price
discrimination in long term insurance contracts.
The process for eliciting useful information from biased parties in cheap talk settings has
spawned a large literature in economics, organization theory and political science. Krishna
10Che and Kartik(2009) come to similar conclusion regarding the decision maker￿ s preference for dealing
with advisers who are known to have a di⁄erent opinion about the state of the world. Ambrus, Azevedo,
Kamada, Takagi (2010) analyze a setting in which biased advisors can be preferred to impartial ones,
which does not have costly information acquisition.
7and Morgan (2008) and Sobel (2008) are recent surveys of some of the more in￿ uential
applications of the theory that include, (in addition to the papers discussed above) Alonso,
Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) in organization theory, Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2007, 2010) and Battaglini (2002) in economics and Austen-Smith (1994)
and Grossman and Helpman (2002) in political Science. This literature encompasses a
wide range of topics and settings, (including opposing advocates, and multidimensional
issues) that the current paper does not address. Our theory focuses instead on explaining
the role of advocates in facilitating the exchange of information for in￿ uence in long term
economic and political decision processes.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Our model of advocacy is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 demonstrates conditions under which informative communication
between the advocate and planner is impossible. In section 4 we characterize when in-
formative communication is possible and how it can be implemented. Section 5 extends
our analysis to two settings. In the ￿rst setting advocates must expend e⁄ort to learn;
we also permit the planner to choose whether to consult an impartial advisor or a known
advocate for advice. The second setting allows the advocate to hide his preferences for
action by choosing the set of issues on which he o⁄ers advice. The combined analyses of
the two settings permits us predict the type environment in which advocacy relationships
are likely to exist. Section 6 concludes with a summary of results and directions for further
research. Proofs of formal results are contained in the appendix.
2 The Model
A planner (e.g. lawmaker, CEO, regulator etc.) faces a decision or sequence of decisions.
In each period, the planner￿ s choice, called the action, is represented by a value q 2 R. The
planner￿ s payo⁄ in each period depends on the action she chooses and an unknown state
of the world x 2 R. Given state x and action q, her payo⁄ is a quadratic loss function:
up (q;x) = ￿(q ￿ x)
2
The planner has no inherent preferences for action; she cares only about choosing the
action that is most appropriate given the state of the environment.
In each period, the true state is independently and identically distributed, but the
8exact distribution of the state in all periods is unknown to the planner. There are two
possible distributions for the state, a high distribution F (xj￿H) and a low distribution
F (xj￿L);.with common support X.11 The expected value of the state under the high
distribution, ￿H; is larger than the expected value of the state under the low distribution,
￿L.
E [xj￿H] = ￿H
E [xj￿L] = ￿L
￿H ￿ ￿L
Given her information at the beginning of the interaction, the planner believes the distri-
bution of the state to be the low distribution with probability ￿ 2 (0;1).
Faced with a choice of action in each period, the planner would clearly bene￿t from
knowing the true distribution at the beginning of the interaction. With quadratic pref-
erences, her ideal action in every period is the mean of the true distribution. However,
if doesn￿ t know the true distribution, her action in any period will re￿ ect all available
information, but it will never be her ideal action. We refer to the situation in which the
planner knows the true distribution as the ￿rst best, and her expected payo⁄ (prior to
learning the true distribution) as the ￿rst best payo⁄, denoted V N.12
Fortunately, an advisor knows the true distribution of the state( though he has no
additional information about the realized state in each period); unfortunately the advisor
is an advocate whose payo⁄ di⁄ers from the planner￿ s:13
ua (q;x) = q
Unlike the planner, who has no inherent preferences for actions, the advocate always
bene￿ts when the planner increases her action, regardless of the true state of the world. The
advocate therefore has an incentive to suggest to the planner that the distribution is ￿H,
to manipulate her into choosing higher actions. The preference misalignment between the
planner and advocate is more extreme than the one frequently analyzed in the cheap talk
and delegation literature;14 the extreme misalignment of preferences acts as a signi￿cant
11The assumption of common support can be easily relaxed, and leads to a similar results.
12It is not di¢ cult to verify that V N = ￿
￿
￿￿2





13More general payo⁄functions of the form ua (q;x) = g1 (x)q+g2 (x) lead to identical results, provided
for both possible distributions D 2 fH;Lg; E [g1 (x)j￿D] > 0 .
14See Ambrus and Egorov, Alonzo and Matouschek, etc. A notable exception is Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2009). According to the usual assumptions of this literature, both the expert and decision
maker have single-peaked preferences, but the expert￿ s most preferred point is shifted relative to the
9barrier to in￿ uential communication.
Payments between the planner and the advocate are either explicitly ruled out, or are
constrained to be independent of the advocate￿ s message. These restrictions may arise for
a variety of legal or institutional reasons; payments between planners and advocates open
the door for a variety of corrupt behaviors. Without payments, the only means by which
the planner can reward or punish the advocate is through her choice of action.
The challenge for the planner is formidable: she would like the advocate to recommend
the best course of action given what he knows, but because the planner can not pay him
for his advice, it is very di¢ cult for the planner to overcome the advocate￿ s incentive to
issue manipulative recommendations. Nonetheless, the advocate does have information
that is valuable to the planner, and the planner has the authority to select actions that
bene￿t the advocate. There are potential gains from an exchange of advice for in￿ uence, if
only the parties could ￿gure out a way to exploit their common interests without money.
2.1 Advice for In￿ uence Game
We model the interaction between planner and advocate as a game in which advice is
exchanged for in￿ uence. The game takes place over periods k = f0;1;::;Ng according to
the following sequence:
0. The advocate observes the true state distribution, ￿L or ￿H, and issues a recommen-
dation (or sends a message) M 2 fH;Lg:15
k=1:N. At the beginning of period k, the planner selects an action qk 2 R. Once the action
is selected, the true state xk is revealed, and both planner and advocate realize their
period k payo⁄s.
The advocate￿ s strategy is a pair of probabilities (rH;rL) 2 [0;1]
2; rX represents the
probability that the advocate reports H when the true distribution is ￿X. In each period,
the planner can base her choice of action in any period on the message she receives from
decision maker by his bias. In our case, the advocate always prefers the the decision maker increase her
action and is in￿nitely biased.
15We have assumed that the message space contains only two messages. In the case of full commitment
the Revelation Principle guarantees that this assumption is without loss of generality. Without commit-
ment, this assumption can be easily relaxed with no impact on the results. We maintain this assumption
to simplify the exposition.







represents the set of possible histories at time k ￿ 1, and hk￿1 = (x1;:::;xk￿1) 2 Xk￿1
represents a particular history of past states,16 then the planner￿ s strategy is a family of
functions, fqM (hk￿1)g
N
k=1, each of which maps the Cartesian Product of M and Xk￿1 into
an action qk 2 R:17
qM (hk￿1) : M ￿ Hk￿1 ! R
Both planner and advocate have a common discount factor ￿:
The equilibrium that we focus on for this game will depend on the setting which best
describes the relationship between the advocate and planner. In particular in situations
where the planner is unable to commit ex ante to a strategy, we analyze Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, PBE, in which the planner and advocate select strategies that are sequentially
rational given the strategy of the other player, and the planner￿ s beliefs are Bayesian up-
dates of her prior based on the observed history and the advocate￿ s strategy. In situations
where the planner can commit to her strategy, we focus on Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms, whereby the planner chooses her action selection to maximize her expected
payo⁄, subject to inducing truthful disclosure from the advocate.
The information structure of the advice for in￿ uence game di⁄ers from the standard
information structure in price discrimination and employment settings in one key respect.
In standard settings the agent￿ s private information is about some attribute of the agent
(e.g. his cost for executing a task, or his valuation for a good); the only way for the
principal to learn this information is to provide the agent with incentives to reveal it. In
contrast, the advocate￿ s private information is about an exogenous feature of the planner￿ s
problem. Each time she repeats the problem, the planner acquires additional information
about this feature, and in the long run, she can learn the advocate￿ s private information
on her own.
16By convention, h0 is the null set and f (h0j￿) = 1:
17Throughout the paper we avoid discussing issues related to variations in the decision maker￿ s strategy
on sets of measure zero without loss of substance. Readers uncomfortable with this can assume that X is
discrete with no substantive changes.
113 Settings Without In￿ uential Communication
With common knowledge of the severe misalignment in preferences, and the lack of avail-
able instruments for aligning incentives, we would expect that in a variety of settings,
the planner would ignore the advocate￿ s advice. The following propositions illustrate two
such settings, shedding light on conditions necessary for communication to be in￿ uential.
Formally, we say that communication is in￿uential if both messages are sent in equilib-
rium, and for some history (or non-negligible set of histories) di⁄erent messages induce
the planner to choose di⁄erent actions. In the alternative, the planner only ever chooses
one sequence of actions on the equilibrium path.
Imagine that the planner and advocate interact for only one period. Because the state
is only learned after the decision has been made, the only information that the planner
could use to help her choose an action is the report of the advocate, but because he
will always try to manipulate the planner, the planner has no choice but to ignore his
recommendation. In this case, even with the ability to commit to her strategy, the planner
is unable to elicit in￿ uential information from the advocate.
Proposition 1.1 In a single period interaction with commitment, in the only incentive
compatible mechanism communication is non-in￿uential.
Proposition 1 is in stark contrast to the single encounter cheap talk literature, exem-
pli￿ed by Crawford and Sobel (1982), and Dessein (2002) who demonstrate the possibility
of in￿ uential communication in one time cheap talk encounters even if the planner can not
commit to an action. The inability of the advocate to in￿ uence the planner in our settings
follows directly from the extreme misalignment of preferences. To illustrate, suppose that
the planner commits to choose action qX if the advocate reports X 2 fH;Lg. If qH 6= qL,
then the advocate will optimally issue the recommendation that induces the higher action.
In order for the recommendation to be incentive compatible, the planner must commit to
the same action for the two reports, so that qH = qL, and the advocate￿ s report can not
in￿ uence the planner choice of action.
The planner￿ s situation seems di⁄erent in a setting with multiple periods, because she
can learn about the true distribution from the observed history. However, if the planner
is unable to commit to her strategy, her actions must be sequentially rational, and only
one action is sequentially rational for any combination of history and message. Although
12the planner will adjust her equilibrium actions to account for her updated beliefs about
the state distribution, she is unable to elicit in￿ uential information from the advocate.
Proposition 1.2 In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the multiperiod game with-
out commitment the advocate￿ s reporting strategy is independent of his information. There
is no in￿uential communication in equilibrium.
With quadratic preferences, the sequentially rational action following a given history is
the conditional expected value of the state
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
where ￿ (hk￿1) represents the updated belief that the distribution is low:
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f(hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f(hk￿1j￿L)+(1￿b ￿)f(hk￿1j￿H)
The planner￿ s updated belief ￿ (hk￿1) is monotone in b ￿, her updated belief that the distri-
bution is low following the advocate￿ s report. By sending a message that induces a lower
belief that the distribution is ￿L the advocate increases the planner￿ s action following any
history of states, improving his payo⁄. Therefore, the advocate always sends the message
associated with the lowest possible posterior belief. When b ￿H 6= b ￿L, he sends only one
message in equilibrium, and the posterior belief associated with this message is equal to
the prior belief. If, b ￿H = b ￿L then both messages may be sent in equilibrium, but, if the
posteriors are equal, the probability of sending either messages can￿ t depend on the true
distribution; therefore, both posteriors are equal to the prior. In both cases, no in￿ uential
communication takes place in equilibrium.
The ￿ndings of Proposition 1.2 provide an interesting contrast to Morris (2001) and
Sobel (1985) who demonstrate the possibility of in￿ uential communication in repeated
settings where the planner is unable to commit. In environments where an advisor wishes
to establish reputation for sharing the planner￿ s preferences, there exists some common
interest between the planner and the advisor that permits the advisor to provide useful
information in exchange for greater in￿ uence in the future. This opportunity does not exist,
however, when the advisor is an advocate with known preferences for extreme actions (the
"bad type" in Morris).
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 make clear that advocates can have no in￿ uence whatsoever,
13unless the planner repeats her problem and can commit to an action policy that depends
on the advocate￿ s report and on the observed history. This is the setting that we next
turn to in section 4.18
4 In￿ uential Communication With Commitment
In this section we consider possibility that the planner can commit to a strategy prior to
receiving the advocate￿ s report, relaxing the requirement that the planner￿ s strategy must
be sequentially rational. Once she selects an action, the planner observes the true state;
each time she repeats the problem, she learns about the true distribution. By committing
to actions, the planner can leverage the additional information revealed by the history of
states to dissuade the advocate from issuing self-serving recommendations.19
The planner commits at the beginning of the interaction to her strategy, or mechanism,
m, that speci￿es an action in each period, conditioned on the advocate￿ s recommendation
and the observed history:
m ￿ fqL (hk￿1);qH (hk￿1)g
N
k=1
The advocate privately observes the true distribution and issues a recommendation. Be-
cause the advocate only has one piece of private information, according to the Revelation
Principle there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to mechanisms that induce
the advocate to issue a truthful recommendation; incentive compatibility requires that the
advocate can not induce a higher discounted sum of expected actions by misreporting the
distribution of the state:
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qL (hk￿1)j￿L] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿L] (ICL)
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qL (hk￿1)j￿H] (ICH)
Because the mechanism is incentive compatible, the planner knows that the advocate￿ s
report is truthful; her expected payo⁄ from o⁄ering m can be written:





(qL (hk￿1) ￿ x)
2 j￿L
￿





(qH (hk￿1) ￿ x)
2 j￿H
￿
18We revisit the possibility that the advocate is unbiased in a later section.
19Throughout the history of states is assumed to be veri￿able. Even if the history were not veri￿able
but some signal correlated with each period￿ s state were veri￿able the mechanism would exhibit similar
features.
14Finally, to ensure that the advocate will participate in the mechanism, it is enough that
the planner commit to interpret the absence of a message as a message in support of
distribution ￿L; constraint (ICH) would then ensure that the advocate (weakly) prefers to
send a message than no message at all.20
The optimal mechanism maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH). In the absence of
incentive constraints, the planner would like to choose the ￿rst-best actions (￿H or ￿L),
but these actions are obviously not incentive compatible. At least one of the incentive
constraints must therefore be binding. For a clue as to which constraint binds, note that
an advocate who learns that the true distribution is ￿H has favorable information and
would have no incentive to report L; on the other hand, an advocate who knows that
the true distribution is ￿L, could try to manipulate the planner by reporting H instead
of L. In light of this intuition, in the appendix we formulate and solve a simple relaxed
problem in which we impose only constraint (ICL).21 We then show that the solution to the
relaxed problem always satis￿es constraint (ICH), and therefore characterizes the optimal
mechanism.22
The optimal mechanism depends on three key variables that we introduce now in
anticipation of the formal results to follow. First, the history of past states hk￿1 in￿ uences






The value of the likelihood ratio indicates which of the two possible distributions are more
consistent with the observed history. High values of ￿(hk￿1) support the inference that
the true distribution is ￿L, while low values of ￿(hk￿1) support the inference that the true
20We will discover that the advocate￿ s payo⁄ under the optimal mechanism is equal to his payo⁄ in the
absence of in￿ uential communication. A participation constraint that requires that the advocate￿ s payo⁄
is no less than he would get in the absence of in￿ uential communication is also satis￿ed.
21The resulting relaxed problem has a concave payo⁄ function and a linear constraint. The solution to
the relaxed problem is the unique stationary point of the Lagrangian.
22Clearly, any mechanism in which there is no in￿ uential communication (because qH (hk￿1) = qL (hk￿1)
for all histories) always satis￿es these constraints, and is therefore feasible; if it is not chosen, it must be
sub-optimal.









Parameter ￿ is an important measure of the "similarity" between distribution ￿L and
￿H that plays a signi￿cant role in a variety of statistical settings; this value is always
larger than one, and is only equal to one if the distributions are the same. Larger values
of ￿ indicate that the distributions are less similar.24 We will see that, in the optimal
mechanism, ￿ is a measure of the strength of the incentives that the planner can provide
without payments. Finally, the solution also depends on parameter
!N =
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N)
￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
This parameter a⁄ects the optimal distortion from the ￿rst best actions, required to in-
duce the advocate to make truthful recommendations. We refer to this parameter as the
magnitude of the distortions. We are now ready to state our ￿rst main result.
Proposition 2 The mechanism which maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH) is
characterized as follows:
(a) If the advocate reports L, the planner￿ s action is a constant, greater than her ￿rst
best action ￿L:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N
(b) If the advocate reports H, the planner￿ s action depends on the observed history and
is always less than her ￿rst best action ￿H
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿!N￿(hk￿1)
(c) The planner￿ s and advocate￿ s payo⁄s are given by
VN = V N ￿ 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
UN = (￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
23By convention, ￿(h0) = 1.
24Throughout we assume that ￿ < 1. By the end of this section, it will become clear that if ￿ = 1,
then the planner can approximate her ￿rst-best payo⁄ even in a ￿nite-period problem.
16Without access to payments, the planner provides incentives for truthful reporting by
committing to vary her actions in response to history. Truth-telling is optimally induced
by rewarding the advocate when he issues recommendations that he personally ￿nds unfa-
vorable and punishing the advocate when he reports personally favorable information that
seems to be inconsistent with the observed history of states. When the advocate reports L,
the distortion from the e¢ cient action is a positive constant, (1 ￿ ￿)!N. By choosing an
action higher than the ￿rst best action ￿L, the planner makes a report of L more attractive
for the advocate, which helps to provide the advocate with incentives to report truthfully.
We interpret the ￿xed reward that follows the advocate revealing personally unfavorable
information as a commitment to compromise.
The planner commits to treat seemingly self-serving advice based on her assessment of
its validity. When the advocate reports H, the planner commits to a history-dependent
distortion that depends on the likelihood ratio, ￿!N￿(hk￿1). If the likelihood ratio is small,
the history of states supports the inference that the distribution is ￿H: The advocate￿ s
advice therefore appears valid, and the planner￿ s action is close to the ￿rst best action ￿H:
If the history of states suggests that the true distribution is ￿L, the advice appears invalid,
and the planner reduces her action; this punishes the advocate but also hurts her payo⁄.
To optimally provide incentives, the planner acts "as if" she is skeptical of the advocate￿ s
advice, cross-checking his recommendation against the observed history, even though she
knows that the advocate￿ s report is truthful. This commitment to update is a common
feature of incentive compatible mechanisms in a variety of settings.25
The less similar the distributions (as measured by ￿), the more the planner bene￿ts
under the mechanism. To understand why, observe that if the advocate reports H when
the true distribution is ￿L, he experiences a negative distortion from action ￿H that is pro-
portional to the likelihood ratio. The expected value of the period k distortion is therefore
￿￿!N￿k￿1. Holding !N ￿xed, increases in ￿ lead to greater punishments for an advocate
who tries to manipulate the planner. If the advocate expects a greater punishment for
manipulation, his incentive to do so is reduced; the planner can therefore reduce the mag-
nitude of the distortions, !N; without violating incentive compatibility. If !N is smaller,
then the distortions from the ￿rst-best actions are smaller for every combination of action
and history, improving the planner￿ s payo⁄. Parameter ￿ therefore represents the strength
25See for example the seminal paper of Holmstorm (1977).
17of the incentives that the planner can provide the advocate by distorting her actions.
Although the planner bene￿ts under this arrangement, the advocate￿ s expected payo⁄
is identical to his expected payo⁄ in the absence of in￿ uential communication.26 This is a
curious result, in light of the fact, that standard incentive theory teaches us that privately
informed agents must be paid information rents in order to divulge their information. This
result points out an interesting di⁄erence between our setting and standard settings; in our
setting incentive compatibility does not guarantee each type of advocate a certain share of
social surplus. In our setting the planner, in some sense, uses the advocate￿ s information
against him, leveraging the fact that the advocate knows the true distribution, and the fact
she has the capability to learn, to provide the advocate with incentives to report honestly.
However, in a setting with costly learning, the absence of rent o⁄ered to the advocate
would appear to undermine the advocate￿ s incentive to acquire information. We turn to
this issue in the next section. Before doing so, we consider the properties of the optimal
mechanism with a large number of periods.
4.1 Properties of the Mechanism in Long Interactions
In a long interaction (N ! 1), the planner is able to learn the true distribution (with
virtual certainty) from the observed history of states. This raises two interesting issues.
First, to what extent does the planner￿ s ability to learn mitigate the information asym-
metry that exists at the beginning of the interaction? Second, if the planner can learn
the true distribution, in the long run does the advocate￿ s recommendation impact the
planner￿ s action? Both of these issues are addressed by the following corollary.
Corollary (High Power Incentives) When 1
￿ ￿ ￿ < 1; as N ! 1; !N ! 0; the opti-
mal mechanism approaches the ￿rst best mechanism, and the planner￿ s payo⁄ approaches
the ￿rst best payo⁄, VN ! V 1
(Low Power Incentives) When ￿ < 1
￿, as N ! 1, !N ! !1 2 (0;1). The optimal mech-
anism converges to an incentive compatible mechanism. The planner￿ s payo⁄ is bounded
away from the ￿rst best payo⁄. When N = 1 the sequence of actions qH (hk￿1)
P ! ￿H
To understand this corollary, recall that if the advocate reports H, but the true dis-
26In the absence of in￿ uential communication the planner￿ s sequentially rational action given a history
is just ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H. By the law of iterated expectation, E [￿ (hk￿1)] = ￿.
18tribution is ￿L; he expects a penalty in the future that grows at rate ￿ ￿ 1. However the
long term growth of this penalty may not be enough to completely eliminate his incentive
to manipulate the planner; the advocate￿ s lifetime penalty for manipulating the planner
is the discounted sum of the expected distortions, which may either converge or diverge.
If the incentives are su¢ ciently high powered, this discounted sum diverges. In the limit,
the powerful incentives completely eliminate the advocate￿ s incentive to manipulate the
planner, the distortions vanish, and the optimal mechanism approaches the ￿rst best.27
Thus when incentives have high power, in a long interaction, there is virtually no dif-
ference between information provided by an advocate, and information that the planner
acquires herself.28 If the incentives have low power, the expected penalty explodes too
slowly relative to discounting, and the discounted sum of expected distortions converges.
The planner can not shrink the magnitude of the distortions to zero without violating
incentive compatibility and, the planner￿ s payo⁄s are bounded away from the ￿rst best.
When the true distribution is ￿H, the planner￿ s action converges in probability to the
￿rst best action ￿H;29 therefore, the damaging distortions associated with a report of
H are inherently a short run phenomenon. However, even in the absence of in￿ uential
communication, the planner￿ s action would converge to ￿H in probability; thus, when
the true distribution is ￿H, the impact of the advocate￿ s recommendation vanishes in the
long run. In contrast, when the true distribution is ￿L, the advocate￿ s impact on the
planner￿ s action never diminishes. Paradoxically, when the advocate makes the seemingly
more believable report, the distortion from the ￿rst best action ￿L persists forever; when
the advocate reports in a seemingly biased way, the distortion from the ￿rst best action
￿H is likely to be small after a large number of periods. In the long run, the advocate￿ s
recommendation only impacts the planner￿ s behavior when he reports against his bias.
27Although the ￿rst best is not incentive compatible, by choosing an arbitrarily large T, and repeating
the optimal T period mechanism an in￿nite number of times, the planner can construct an in￿nitely
repeated mechanism that is incentive compatible and approximates her payo⁄ under the ￿rst best with
arbitrary degree of accuracy.
28This result does not merely hold in the limit as ￿ ! 1, but is valid for any value of ￿ ￿ 1
￿.
29The asymptotic behavior of the distortions is driven by the asymptotic behavior of the like-
lihood ratio under distribution ￿H, which converges in probability to zero. Therefore, limN!1
Pr(jqH (hN￿1) ￿ ￿Hj ￿ ") = 1, for any ", no matter how small.
195 Motivating Learning, Discovering Hidden Agendas
The theory of advocacy we have developed so far explores how a planner can elicit a
truthful recommendations from an informed, but extremely biased advocate. In analyzing
this question, we assumed that the advocate was already informed before encountering the
planner.30 However, if he is uninformed (initially), learning is costly, and the planner has
an opportunity to exert e⁄ort to become informed, the advocate seems almost irrelevant.
Like the planner, he is uninformed, and if he does become informed (which the planner
can not independently verify), he has an incentive to issue manipulative recommendations.
Why bother? Why would planners consult advocates as opposed to unbiased advisors?
From the advocate￿ s perspective, the situation does not appear to be much better. His
recommendation in￿ uences the planner￿ s behavior, but on average advising the planner
does not bene￿t his cause. Why would he exert e⁄ort to learn? How can planners optimally
motivate advocates to acquire information? We turn to these issues in the subsection 5.1.
To this point we have also assumed that the extreme con￿ ict of interest between the
planner and advocate is common knowledge. In subsection 5.2, we analyze the impact of
impartial advisors on the advisory relationship. For example, if some portion of ￿nancial
advisors takes its ￿duciary responsibilities seriously and o⁄ers advice in the best interest
of the client, how can the client separate the impartial advisor from the self-interested
advisors? Who bene￿ts under these modi￿ed arrangements?
5.1 Motivating a Known Advocate to Learn
In certain settings, the advocate may need to expend resources to become informed. For
instance, a pharmaceutical company spends signi￿cant resources running clinical trials in
order to determine the likely impact of its drug. Similarly, in order to truly determine
the likely academic impact of school nutrition programs the child advocate may spend
time and e⁄ort collecting and analyzing large quantities of data. In these situations, the
planner￿ s reliance on the advocate seems puzzling; if the advocate is uninformed initially
and has an obvious incentive to manipulate his ￿ndings31 why wouldn￿ t the planner learn
30or could become informed at zero cost
31Short of outright falsi￿cation of its ￿ndings, the pharmaceutical company may manipulate the criteria
by which it selects patients for trials, how it determines ongoing eligibility, and how it de￿nes the side
e⁄ects. It also may be virtually impossible for the Welfare Commission to audit the data acquired by the
child advocate; even if he discloses this data it would be di¢ cult to independently verify that this data is
20from an unbiased party or expend e⁄ort to learn herself? Furthermore, if (as in the
previous section) he expects to have no impact on the planner the advocate may have
weak incentives to acquire information; how can the planner motivate him to learn? From
a social perspective, is it a good idea for the planner to acquire information from the
advocate?
In light of these issues, we consider how the advocate might be motivated to gather
the information that the planner requires to make decisions. In order to acquire informa-
tion, the advocate must expend c ￿ 0 resources, in the form of money, time and e⁄ort;
throughout the section, we focus on the case of relatively small values for c.32 Crucially,
the advocate￿ s decision to become informed can not be observed by the planner. The
advocate not only has the ability to lie when issuing an informed recommendation, he can
issue a recommendation without exerting e⁄ort to acquire any information at all. We start
by deriving the optimal incentive compatible mechanism that provides incentives for the
advocate to acquire information. This will help us understand how the planner motivates
the advocate to acquire information. We will then compare the optimal mechanism to
consulting an impartial advisor or exerting e⁄ort, to help us understand why an advocate
may be preferred to an impartial advisor.
If the planner would like to motivate the advocate to become informed, two additional
constraints appear in the mechanism design problem. If an advocate decides to remain
uninformed, he could just issue an uninformed recommendation, either H or L.33 On
the other hand, if the advocate chooses to acquire information, he anticipates that with
probability ￿ he will learn that the distribution is ￿L, and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ he
will learn that the distribution is ￿H; whatever, he learns, (ICH) and (ICL) ensure that
he will report truthfully. Therefore, for the advocate to choose to learn, exerting e⁄ort
and reporting truthfully should be preferred by an uninformed advocate to not exerting
e⁄ort and either reporting H all the time (AICH) or reporting L all the time (AICL).
accurate.
32This is the most relevant case for the issues that we analyze. Although running clinical trials can
be expensive, the cost can be small in comparison to the gains and losses inherent in the outcome of the
FDA￿ s decision. The cuto⁄ between small and large costs, e c; is de￿ned in the appendix. While we discuss
the mechanism that induces learning with high costs in a later footnote, we point out that if the cost is
high enough, inducing learning is not in the planner￿ s interest.
33Unless the uninformed advocate is indi⁄erent between reporting H all the time and reporting L all
the time, he would never choose to randomize. In the cases we consider in the body of the paper, an
uninformed advocate always strictly prefers to report H.
21Formulating and simplifying these constraints leads to the following conditions:
PN
k=1 ￿




k￿1E [qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿ (AICL)
Of course, the optimal mechanism must also satisfy the constraints for truthful reporting:
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1) ￿ qL (hk￿1)j￿L] ￿ 0 (ICL)
PN
k=1 ￿
k￿1E [qH (hk￿1) ￿ qL (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ 0 (ICH)
Writing the constraints in this way makes it apparent that if c = 0, the constraints for
reporting truthfully and the constraints for acquiring it are identical. Furthermore, be-
cause the optimal mechanism of Proposition 3 satis￿es (ICL) as an equality, it violates
constraint (AICH); if information acquisition is costly and subject to moral hazard, then
confronted with the mechanism of proposition 3, an advocate would never acquire infor-
mation and would always report H. Finally, it is clear that the constraints for incentive
compatible information acquisition imply the incentive constraints for truthful reporting;
constraints (ICL) and (ICH) can therefore be ignored in the planner￿ s problem. As before,
participation at both interim and ex ante stages is ensured by the planner￿ s commitment
to interpret the absence of a message as a report of L. If the planner makes such a com-
mitment, constraint (AICL) would ensure that the advocate prefers to learn rather than
report nothing to the planner.34
We derive the optimal mechanism that induces information acquisition by maximizing
(P) subject to (AICH) and (AICL).
Proposition 3 For small costs, the mechanism that maximizes (P) subject to (AICH)





(a) The planner￿ s actions are
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) e !N
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿e !N￿(hk￿1)
34This may be a strong assumption in certain settings. See the extended appendix for a discussion of
the case in which the planner must act in a sequentially rational manner following the advocate￿ s refusal of
the mechanism at the ex ante stage. There are some interesting details in this discussion, but the results
are qualitatively similar.
22(b) The planner￿ s and advocate￿ s payo⁄s are given by
V c






1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
Uc
N = UN ￿ c
(c) If !N is not too large, the planner prefers to o⁄er an uninformed advocate the optimal
mechanism to acquire information and report truthfully, rather than pay an impartial
advisor to acquire the information or exert e⁄ort to acquire the information herself
Proposition three indicates that when the cost of acquiring information is strictly pos-
itive the planner "raises the stakes" of the mechanism, rewarding the advocate more when
he reports personally unfavorable information and proportionally increasing the downward
distortion (for every history) when the advocate reports a personally favorable distribu-
tion. Intuitively, there are two types that could pro￿tably deviate by reporting the high
distribution: the type that learned that the true distribution is ￿L, and the uninformed
advocate, who is pretending to be informed. Because a report of the low distribution can
still be believed, the structure of the mechanism is similar to the zero-cost case. To moti-
vate the advocate to learn, the magnitude of the distortions needs to be increased relative
to the zero-cost case. With zero cost of information, the goal was to prevent an advocate
from deliberately misleading the planner; here the mechanism also needs to motivate the
advocate to exert e⁄ort to learn, rather than "gamble" by reporting H without learning
anything. This result is similar to Szalay (2005) and Lewis and Sappington (1997) who
￿nd that increasing the variation in payo⁄s for privately informed agents is the optimal
way to induce the agents to gather information.35
In the optimal mechanism the social cost of information acquisition exceeds c. Although
the advocate bears the full cost c himself, in order to motivate the advocate to learn, the
planner must increase the magnitude of the distortions inherent in the mechanism, hurting
her own payo⁄. If the planner can acquire the information herself at cost c (or hire an
impartial advisor to do so on her behalf), it is socially wasteful for the planner to rely on
35In the case of large costs the optimal mechanism is quite di⁄erent. When the cost of becoming
informed is very high, not becoming informed at all becomes tempting for the advocate. Although no
advocate would ever report L to manipulate the decision maker, if the cost of acquiring information is
very high, the advocate may report L as a way to avoid learning the true distribution. The decision maker
must cross-check both reports against the history in order to provide the advocate with incentives to exert
e⁄ort in learning the true distribution.
23the advocate.
Although it is socially ine¢ cient, the planner may prefer to deal with the advocate
rather than pay an impartial agent to acquire the information or exert e⁄ort c to acquire
the information herself. The planner cares only about her own payo⁄, so she would prefer to
interact with the advocate if the cost of direct information acquisition c, were greater than









!N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
A small value of !N ensures that this inequality is satis￿ed;36 it also guarantees that the
planner prefers the mechanism that induces learning to going it alone.37
This result may seem quite surprising, but the rationale for the planners￿preference to
consult an advocate for advice is quite compelling. Imagine that the planner has access
to the same information acquisition technology as the advocate. If she exerts e⁄ort to
learn,.the planner doesn￿ t need to worry about truthful revelation of information, but she
bears the full cost of information acquisition. On the other hand, because of his extreme
bias, when dealing with an advocate, the planner bears a cost of inducing the advocate to
truthfully report his information; however, because he cares about her actions, the planner
can use her actions to motivate the advocate to acquire information. By increasing the
magnitude of the distortions, the planner passes the direct cost of information acquisition
to the advocate, hurting her own expected payo⁄ in the process .However, when the
advocate expects a large lifetime penalty from reporting H when the true distribution is
￿L, either deliberately or because he is uninformed, the planner does not need to increase
the magnitude very much (in absolute terms) in order to induce learning. In this case the
total loss of payo⁄ to the planner from acquiring truthful information using the optimal
mechanism is smaller than the cost of direct information acquisition.38
36As discussed in the previous section, if ￿ ￿ 1
￿, then as N ! 1, !N ! 0. Alternatively, keeping N
￿xed, if ￿ is large then !N is close to zero.
37It is worth pointing out that for su¢ ciently small costs, the planner prefers the mechanism that
induces learning to the case of no in￿ uential communication, regardless of !N. Because the mechanism
with c = 0 is always preferred by the planner to the case without in￿ uential communication, by continuity,
for c small, the mechanism is also be preferred to the case without in￿ uential communication.
38This result does not rely on the assumption that the planner commits to interpret the absence of
message as L. If the planner were unable to make such a commitment, she would act in a sequentially
rational manner following rejection of the agreement by the advocate at the ex ante stage, leaving him
with an outside option of UN. With this outside option, the mechanism of proposition 3 would be rejected;
to induce the advocate to accept, the planner will optimally o⁄er the same mechanism as in proposition
24This result suggests an important explanation for the prominence of advocates in many
regulatory, policy making and personal decision making processes, including some of the
ones that we￿ ve highlighted in the introduction. In contrast to impartial advisors, ad-
vocates represent a particular point of view or interest that is a⁄ected by the planner￿ s
decision. Because of this, the planner has some power over the advocate; she can use her
decisions to motivate the advocate to acquire information. As a result it can be easier
and less costly for a planner to rely on a biased advocate rather than an objective adviser
to acquire the information that is needed for decision making. Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999) make a similar argument in their explanation of why an advocacy system may be
preferred to a tribunal in fact ￿nding processes, though in their setting no manipulation is
possible. Che and Kartik (2009) point to a similar rationale to explain why planners may
prefer to consult with advisers who share their preferences but have di⁄erent prior beliefs
about the best action to take.
5.2 Discovering Hidden Agendas
Known advocates can not escape from the fact that they have no inherent credibility; any
in￿ uence which they have on decision making is exclusively a consequence of the planner￿ s
design. Even if the advocate for children has acquired excellent information about the likely
bene￿ts of the head start program, because it is common knowledge that he supports this
cause, only the planner can provide the advocate with incentives to reveal his information
truthfully, thereby giving the advice credibility and in￿ uence. Is this inevitable? Can the
advocate exert a greater impact for her cause by being less transparent to the commission
about the issues that he supports?
Imagine that the planner is crafting new legislation that de￿nes the goals and responsi-
bilities for a future health and welfare initiative.39 The legislation prioritizes support for a
variety of social programs, including education, health and human services, and childhood
nutrition. The planner requires the advice of a knowledgeable advisor on how to draft the





added to every action, independent of the report or
the history. Taken together, these additional distortions exactly compensate the advocate for the cost of
learning, leaving him an ex ante payo⁄ of UN. In this circumstance, the planner implicitly commits to











and the corollary continues to hold. See the extended appendix for more information.
39A similar example is in Morris (2001).
25legislation to be most e⁄ective. The advisor￿ s motives for advising the planner may be
unknown; he may have an allegiance to a special interest group whose agenda he would like
to promote, or he may have no agenda at all, issuing truthful recommendations without
concern for their impact on the legislation. Alternatively, imagine that a ￿nancial advisor
is o⁄ering a client investment advice and services. In o⁄ering advice, he may be pursuing
his own bottom line, or he may feel bound by certain oaths or obligations to place the
interests of the client ahead of his own.
To account for these possibilities, we admit the possibility that the advisor is impartial
into the model. An impartial advisor is indi⁄erent over actions and is always willing
to report his information truthfully. If the planner could observe that her advisor is
impartial, she would optimally delegate her choice of action to him with no restrictions.
However, if the advisor￿ s con￿ ict of interest is privately known, an advocate would have an
incentive to misrepresent himself as impartial in order to give a manipulative report of H
the appearance of credibility. We therefore augment the mechanism to provide incentives
for an advisor to voluntarily reveal a hidden agenda, if it exists.
In analyzing this issue, we assume that the planner can not prevent the advisor from
learning both the true distribution and his preferences simultaneously. If it were possible
for the planner to control the advisor￿ s access to information, the planner would require
that the advisor disclose a con￿ ict of interest before allowing him to learn the true distri-
bution. We do not allow this type of restriction to avoid discussing the issue of whether
this type of control over information is possible, how the planner could implement this
type of restriction and whether such a restriction is consistent with zero cost of learning,
which we assume throughout this section.40
With uncertainty about the advisor￿ s preferences, the agreement between the planner
and the advisor is governed by a mechanism that is more elaborate than in earlier sections.
With a hidden agenda, there are two possible types of advisors, advocates (with a hidden
agenda) and impartial advisors. The advisor￿ s private information consists of the true
distribution and his agenda, and could be of four possible types. We assume that the
probability that the advisor is an advocate is a; we also assume that the advisor￿ s agenda
is statistically independent of whether the distribution is ￿H or ￿L. The mechanism
40In the extended appendix we analyze the optimal mechanism assuming that the planner can restrict
access to information in this way. We will discuss some of the results in a later footnote. Interested readers
should consult the extended appendix for more information.
26o⁄ered by the planner is therefore a family of four functions, one function for each possible













If the advocate reports that he has preferences t 2 fi;ag (where i denotes the impartial
type), and that the true distribution is ￿Z, the planner commits to implement actions
qt
Z (hk￿1). The planner￿ s expected payo⁄ from an incentive compatible mechanism is just
a weighted average of her payo⁄s from the "sub-mechanism" intended for the impartial
advisor, mi = (qi
H (hk￿1);qi




P d (mi;ma) = (1 ￿ a)P (mi) + aP (ma)
In order for the mechanism to be incentive compatible, the advisor should be willing to
disclose both the distribution and his con￿ ict of interest truthfully. Because the impartial
advisor is indi⁄erent over all possible outcomes, he is always willing to do so; however, the
advocate type needs incentives to report truthfully. This leads to a set of six incentive




Z (hk￿1) ￿ qa




Z (hk￿1) ￿ qa
H (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿ 0 (ICH-Z,t)
Z 2 fH;Lg;t 2 fi;ag
The optimal mechanism maximizes (PD) subject to the system (ICD). Intuitively,
we would expect that several of these constraints would not be binding in the optimal
mechanism.41 In the appendix we formulate a relaxed problem in which we impose only
constraints (ICL-H,a), (ICL-H,i). We then prove that the solution to the relaxed prob-
lem satis￿es the remaining constraints, and therefore characterizes the optimal incentive
41The advocate has an incentive to claim to be impartial in order to give a manipulative report of
H additional credibility. There is no reason for the advocate to claim to be impartial, while issuing a
report of L. Furthermore, following the reasoning in section 3, we would also suspect that (ICH-L,a) is
non-binding. There is no simple intuition that suggests that either of the remaining constraints are non-
binding: an advocate who knows the distribution is ￿L could potentially bene￿t by reporting H (ICL-H,a),
he could also potentially bene￿t by claiming to be impartial and reporting H (ICL-H,i). Furthermore, the
advocate who knows that the true distribution is ￿H could try to gain additional credibility by claiming
to be impartial and reporting H (ICH-H,i). Although there is no good reason to eliminate (ICH-H,i), it
turns out to be active in the optimal mechanism, but with a zero Lagrange multiplier; it is active but not
binding.
27compatible mechanism. Before stating the proposition, we introduce a parameter:
￿ = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
This parameter is very similar to the magnitude introduced in section 3; in fact, a = 1
implies ￿ = !N. Furthermore, parameter ￿ plays a very similar role to !N in the optimal
mechanism, but unlike !N which enters the planner￿ s promised actions in a "symmetric"
way in propositions 2 and 3, ￿ does not enter in a symmetric way in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The mechanism that maximizes (PD) subject to (ICD) is characterized
as follows:
(a) If the advisor claims to be impartial and reports L, the planner￿ s action is equal to
the ￿rst best action
q
i
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
(b) If the advisor claims to be an advocate and reports L, the planner￿ s action is a
constant, greater than her ￿rst best action ￿L:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
(c) If the advisor reports H, regardless of his claim about his preferences, the planner￿ s




H (hk￿1) = q
a
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
(d) If the advisor is an advocate his expected payo⁄ is given by
UN + 1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿:
Proposition 4 illustrates the di⁄erences that arise when the advocate￿ s preferences on a
speci￿c issue are not common knowledge. Because the advocate would have no reason to
claim to be impartial and then report L, a report of L from an advisor who claims to be
impartial can be believed at face value. A report of H is treated identically, whether the
advisor is an advocate or claims to be impartial; however, the magnitude of the distortion
28associated with a self serving report, a￿N, is smaller the greater the probability that the
advisor is impartial. The possibility that the advisor is impartial allows the planner to
treat reports of H with greater credibility. On the other hand, the constant distortion
induced when the advisor reveals a con￿ ict of interest, but reports against his bias is
larger when there is a possibility that the advisor may be impartial. Because the planner
gives greater credibility to reports of H, these reports are more attractive to an advocate
who knows that the distribution is actually ￿L.This increases the advocate￿ s incentive to
issue manipulative advice, and the planner must compensate the advocate for reporting L
with an additional distortion.42
The advocate￿ s world changes for the better when he becomes less transparent and his
allegiance to special interests are more di¢ cult to predict. When there is a possibility that
the advocate is not an advocate but rather an impartial advisor, the planner bene￿ts from
a greater compromise with the true advocate. The advocate earns a rent for disclosing his
agenda, and his ex ante payo⁄ from the mechanism rises above UN, his expected payo⁄
if he were not consulted and his advice was totally ignored. Finally, the advocate is able
to have a positive impact on the welfare of the special interests that he supports. It is
ironic, however, that in order to help his cause the advocate must disavow and conceal
his support of the cause that he cares so deeply about! In e⁄ect, just as Morris (2001)
demonstrates that "bad advisors" can gain a reputation for being impartial, and Sobel
￿nds that "unfriendly" advisors can establish a reputation for acting in the best interests
of the decision maker, we ￿nd that if the advocate￿ s ties to special interests are hidden,
the advocate can credibly claim to be impartial, and is therefore better o⁄.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a theory of advocacy that attempts to explain why planners take
advice from an advocate with a known allegiance to a special interest or cause.
We show that advocates can only in￿ uence a policy maker￿ s decision, when she commits
42Similar results hold if the planner can prevent the advocate from learning the true distribution until
he has disclosed his interest con￿ ict. In that setting, the planner is able to treat the advice of an impartial
advisor who reports H di⁄erently from the advice of an advocate who reports H. Both of these sequences
of messages lead to stochastic distortions that depend of ￿(hk￿1), but the impartial type generates smaller
distortions on average; however the advocate does not capitalize on this because he earns a rent. See the
extended appendix for more information.
29to act on the advice from an advocate that proves to be credible. The commitment to action
can be implemented by the planner delegating or regulating the actions that the advocate
takes based on how accurate her predictions turn out to be. Provisional agreements likes
these to delegate decision making authority to a trusted adviser are common in settings
were elected representatives cede important decisions to better informed agency sta⁄ or
where clients entrust the management of their private wealth to a respected ￿nancial
adviser. Moreover we show that planners may prefer the advice of a biased advocate to
the recommendation of an indi⁄erent adviser in instances where information about the
planner￿ s problem is costly to acquire. Finally our theory predicts that advocates are
better served to conceal their ties to special interest as this permits them to have greater
sway over the planners that they advise.
Our theory of advocacy is special in a number of respects and therefore the predictions
of our model should be interpreted with some care. For instance, we assume that there
is just one advocate who can advise the planner. In many applications, including judicial
and policy making deliberations, it is common for decision makers to consult two or more
advocates representing opposing interests. One fruitful direction for future research would
be to extend our analysis to consider how ￿dueling￿advocates representing disparate points
of view may be most e⁄ectively paired to provide informative advice to a policy maker.
More generally, the optimal use of advocates with known allegiances might be analyzed
as an optimal fact ￿nding mechanisms in which informed parties with di⁄ering views are
assigned to gather information and make recommendations to common decision maker who
may commit to a course of action conditional on the recommendations of the advocates
as well as their relative ￿track￿records in predicting the history of states occurring.
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347 Appendix
In the appendix we prove the results discussed in the body of the text. A more complete
appendix with proofs of assertions in footnotes is available upon request.
Proposition 1.1 In a single period interaction with commitment, the only incentive com-
patible mechanism is non-in￿uential: qH = qL:
Proof 1.1 Discussed in text
Lemma 1: If the decision maker begins with belief b ￿ that the true distribution is ￿L, the
unique sequentially rational action in period k following history hk￿1 is the expected value
of the state, updated based on the observed history:
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
Proof: If she begins her sequence of decisions with belief Pr(￿ = ￿L) = b ￿ the sequentially









































2 + 2￿Lq (hk￿1) ￿ ￿L
￿
dhk￿1









2 + 2￿Hq (hk￿1) ￿ ￿H
￿
dhk￿1
by introducing a variable to denote the decision maker￿ s belief that the distribution is
￿L given the observed history of states, ￿ (hk￿1); and the conditional mean, ￿(hk￿1) the
35objective function can be simpli￿ed even further
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
￿(hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H










2 + 2￿(hk￿1)q (hk￿1) ￿ ￿ (hk￿1)
￿
dhk￿1
The ￿rst and second order conditions imply that the unique sequentially rational decision
following history hk￿1 is given by
q (hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
Therefore, given an initial belief b ￿, following observed history hk￿1 the unique sequentially
rational actions is
e q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
QED
Proposition 1.2 In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the multiperiod game without
commitment the advocate￿ s reporting strategy is independent of his information. There is
no in￿uential communication in equilibrium.
Proof: We prove this result by constructing the PBE of this game. Once the planner
receives a message from the advocate, she Bayesian updates her belief that the distribu-
tion is ￿L to either b ￿H or b ￿L. She then faces a repeated single-player decision problem.
According to Lemma 1, the planner￿ s unique sequentially rational action following history
36hk￿1; given that her initial belief is b ￿ is the conditional expected value of the state.
q (b ￿;hk￿1) = ￿ (hk￿1)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ (hk￿1))￿H
￿ (hk￿1) = Pr(￿ = ￿Ljhk￿1) =
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L)
b ￿f (hk￿1j￿L) + (1 ￿ b ￿)f (hk￿1j￿H)
Because ￿ (hk￿1) is monotone decreasing with respect to b ￿, inducing a smaller value of
b ￿ increases the planner￿ s action following every history, bene￿tting the advocate. Recall
that the advocate￿ s strategy is just (rH;rL) 2 [0;1]
2, where rX represents the probability
that the advocate reports H when the true distribution is ￿X. The advocate￿ s sequentially
rational strategy is therefore
b ￿H > b ￿L ! rH = 0; rL = 0
b ￿H < b ￿L ! rH = 1; rL = 1
b ￿H = b ￿L ! rH 2 [0;1]; rL 2 [0;1]
Consider ￿rst the case in which b ￿H > b ￿L (the reverse case is identical, replacing H
and L). In this case, the advocate always reports L. Upon observing L, the planner￿ s
Bayesian update is equal to the prior, b ￿L = ￿. The o⁄-the path-belief associated with a
report of H is assigned to be any value b ￿H > ￿. The planner￿ s actions are q (￿;hk￿1) if the
advocate reports L and the planner observes history hk￿1, and q (b ￿H;hk￿1) if the planner
receives message H and observes history hk￿1 (o⁄ the equilibrium path):These strategies
and beliefs together constitute a PBE.
The remaining possibility is that b ￿H = b ￿L. In this case, the advocate can send either
message with any probability, as the advocate is indi⁄erent between the messages. If only
one message is sent in equilibrium the PBE is identical to the one described previously. If
both messages are sent in equilibrium, then according to Bayes Rule,
b ￿H =
￿rL
￿rL + (1 ￿ ￿)rH
b ￿L =
￿ (1 ￿ rL)
￿ (1 ￿ rL) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ rH)
37It a matter if calculation to verify that
b ￿H = b ￿L ! rH = rL
rH = rL ! b ￿H = b ￿L = ￿
Thus, the only other possible PBE has rH = rL = r 2 (0;1), b ￿H = b ￿L = ￿, and an
action conditional on history q (￿;hk￿1), regardless of the message sent. In both cases, the
Bayesian update on the equilibrium path is equal to the prior, and on the equilibrium path,
the planner￿ s actions are q (￿;hk￿1). There is no in￿ uential communication in equilibrium.
QED
Lemma 2 A mechanism qL (hk￿1) = ￿L+(1 ￿ ￿)w, qH (hk￿1) = ￿H￿￿w￿(hk￿1) satis￿es




k￿1E [qH (hk￿1)j￿H] ￿
PN
k=1 ￿

























f (hk￿1j￿H)(￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)w)dhk￿1
Because f (hk￿1j￿H)￿(hk￿1) = f (hk￿1j￿L), this line simpli￿es
(￿H ￿ ￿w) 1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)w) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
,
w ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L
QED
Lemma 3 The planner￿s payo⁄ under mechanism qL (hk￿1) = ￿L+(1 ￿ ￿)w, qH (hk￿1) =
38￿H ￿ ￿w￿(hk￿1) is given by.
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H ￿ ￿2w2￿2 (hk￿1))dhk￿1 =
V N ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w2
￿
1￿￿N






Proposition 2 The mechanism which maximizes (P) subject to (ICL) and (ICH) is char-
acterized by
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N








￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
39provided ￿ is ￿nite. The planner￿ s payo⁄ VN, and the advocate￿ s payo⁄ UN are given by
VN = V N ￿ 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
UN = (￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H) 1￿￿N
1￿￿
Proof: We ￿rst derive the optimal mechanism in a relaxed problem, imposing only con-
straint (ICL). Using Lemma 2, we show that the solution satis￿es constraint (ICH). Finally












































f (hk￿1j￿L)qH (hk￿1)dhk￿1 (ICL)
The objective problem is strictly concave, and the constraint is linear. The solution
is therefore the unique stationary point of the Lagrangian. Simplifying the planner￿ s































f (hk￿1j￿L)[qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1)]dhk￿1
40The stationarity conditions are therefore,
qL (hk￿1) : ￿
k￿1f (hk￿1j￿L)f2￿ (￿L ￿ qL (hk￿1)) + ￿g = 0
qH (hk￿1) : ￿
k￿1f (hk￿1j￿H)
n











f (hk￿1j￿L)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 = 0
These ￿rst order conditions imply that:
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + ￿
2￿





2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Then the ￿rst order conditions simplify to
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!N
qH (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿!N￿(hk￿1)






















































+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
N￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)
By Lemma 2, to establish that this mechanism satis￿es (ICH) it is enough to verify that
!N ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L):
!N ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L ,
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N)
￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿N) ￿ 1 ,




















where the last line follows because ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, we calculate the expected payo⁄s. For
the planner apply Lemma 3:









V N ￿ 1￿￿N


























UN = ￿uL + (1 ￿ ￿)uH







Proposition 3 For small costs, the mechanism that maximizes (P) subject to (AICH) and
(AICL) is given by
qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) e !N




Constraint (AICH) is active at the optimum, and constraint (AICL) is slack. The planner￿ s
payo⁄ under this contract is given by
V c








!N (￿ ￿ ￿2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
while the advocate￿ s payo⁄ is UN ￿ c.









































f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿ (AICL)





















































The stationarity conditions conditions are:














44Making our favorite substitution:
￿H = 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!H
￿L = 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!L
The complete set of Kuhn Tucker conditions can be written:
Stat: qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!L
f(hk￿1j￿H)
f(hk￿1j￿L)












































f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿
DF !H ￿ 0, !L ￿ 0
Consider ￿rst the !H > 0, !L = 0 (AICH Active, AICL Slack): In this case, the
most pressing deviation that must be prevented is that of an uninformed advocate who
represents himself as informed, and learning that the true distribution is ￿H: This case is
most similar to the zero-cost case. Under this assumption, the KT conditions become
Stat: qL (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!H



















f (hk￿1j￿H)(qL (hk￿1) ￿ qH (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ ￿ c
1￿￿
DF !H ￿ 0




























k￿1 (!H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)) ￿ ￿
c
1 ￿ ￿











































































































we have a solution. As established previously, when c = 0, this condition is satis￿ed.
The left hand side of the inequality grows with c, while the right hand side shrinks. Both
sides are linear in c, and therefore there is only one intersection. Call the intersection e c.
For c ￿ e c the solution presented holds. Applying Lemma 3 yields:
47V
C



































!N (￿H ￿ ￿L)
This proves Proposition 3
QED
Proposition 4 The mechanism that maximizes (PD) subject to (ICD) is given by
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿N
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿N)
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi
H (hk￿1) = qa
H (hk￿1)
￿N = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
If the advisor is an advocate, his expected payo⁄ under this mechanism is given by UN +
1￿￿N
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿N.








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa







H (hk￿1) ￿ qa
L (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0
This problem has a concave objective function and linear constraints. The KT conditions
therefore characterize the solution. Making substitutions
￿1
2(1 ￿ a)a(1 ￿ ￿)￿
= !1
￿2
2a￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
= !2
48and assuming both constraints are binding, the KT conditions reduce to
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi







L (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)!2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1
qa










H (hk￿1) ￿ qa







H (hk￿1) ￿ qa








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa
















￿H ￿ a￿!1￿k￿1 ￿ ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1
￿
= 0 ￿





!1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) 1￿￿N
1￿￿ !2 + 1￿￿N








H (hk￿1) ￿ qa




















1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)!1 ￿
￿






1￿￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L) = 0
It is straightforward to check that:
!1 = (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
!2 = a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
49and both of these values are positive. The solution to the relaxed problem is therefore:
qi
L (hk￿1) = ￿L
qi
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)
￿
a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿
qa
L (hk￿1) = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)a (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
As in the proposition: The other constraints need to be veri￿ed. Because (H;i) is treated
the same as a report of (H;a) a ￿H-advocate has no gain from reporting (H;i). For the







f (hk￿1j￿L)(qH (hk￿1) ￿ q
a





























H (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0



























H (hk￿1))dhk￿1 ￿ 0






























a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿￿




a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿
￿
￿L + (1 ￿ ￿) (1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿)
a￿(1￿￿)(1￿(￿￿)N)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿N)(1￿￿￿) (￿H ￿ ￿L)


















To verify the advocate￿ s payo⁄, note that the advocate is o⁄ered mechanism:
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)a￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
As previously established, a mechanism
qa
L = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)a￿
qa
H (hk￿1) = ￿H ￿ ￿￿(hk￿1)(a￿)
leaves the advocate with payo⁄UN. Therefore, if the advisor is an advocate, and draws L,
(probability ￿) the planner selects a higher action in each period than under the no-rent







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)￿
51QED
52